The ideology of free trade and the Cuba exception by Schena, Michael C.
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
2006
The ideology of free trade and the Cuba exception
Michael C. Schena
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, mschen1@lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation











Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
In partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of 
















Michael C. Schena 
B.A., Louisiana State University, 2004 
December 2006 
Table of Contents 
 
 ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………iii 
         
I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………1 
        
II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………………...3 
 1. United States Trade Policy with Cuba……………………………………....4 
 2. Helms-Burton Act…………………………………………………………….6 
 3. Economic Impact on the United States……………………………………...8 
 4. Domestic Pressures………………………………………………………….10 
       
III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES………………………………………………….16 
      
IV. DESIGN…………………………………………………………………………….21 
 1. Members of Congress……………………………………………………….21 
 2. Roll Call Votes……………………………………………………………….21 
 3. D-Nominate Ideology Scores………………………………………………..24 
 4. Other Constraints …………………………………………………………...25
 5. Regression……………………………………………………………………26 
        
V. DISCUSSION……………………………………………………………………….30 
        
SOURCES………………………………………………………………………………34 
         
APPENDIX 1: ROLL CALL VOTES………………………………………………...37 
      











  This paper examines ideology and congressional roll call voting in the post-Cold 
War period (1991-2005) on free trade and trade policy with Cuba. While members with a 
more conservative ideology are found, as expected, to be supporters of free trade 
generally, there remains a curious disconnect between this general support for free trade 
and the opposition to liberalization of trade with Cuba. Yet despite this perceived 
inconsistency, ideology remains consistent on both, thus we seek to test this exception to 
conservative support for liberalization. 
A combination of factors is at play to which make Cuba a special case in the post 
cold war era. For one thing the Castro regime, one of the last “true communists”, remains 
in power. This alone could explain some of the deviation from support of liberalized 
trade and the ideological opposition. With China ideology is not an issue, but with Cuba 
it is.  Further complicating relations, the Cuban American National Foundation and its 
powerful PAC branch that exert political clout through donations and lobbying tactics.  
The study of ideology is crucial to understanding the persistence of the elite 
commitment to open markets since the 1970s in the face of a powerful resurgence of 
protectionism. The continuing power of free trade politics stems from the consolidation 






As 1991 came to a close the Cold War had passed. Germany was reunited, the 
Soviet Union collapsed and the former Warsaw Pact nations sought to liberalize their 
economies as the Communist Bloc fell apart. Thirteen years later, the former Soviet 
Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania granted membership in the European Union, 
the United States granted permanent Most Favored Nation status to the People’s Republic 
of China, and trade opened up to Vietnam. Yet, the US policy toward a tiny island nation 
ninety miles south of Miami remains deadlocked in a 1962 Cold War mindset. For the 
rest of the world, the conflict between communism and capitalism has long since been 
resolved, yet in the Straits of Florida, the Cold War remains in stalemate.  
Congressional voting on Cuba trade policy has a multifaceted complexity 
stemming from ideology, party allegiances and individual preferences on issues. This 
problem is further complicated when comparing member’s records on trade policy 
including free trade initiatives, tariffs and sanctions with voting on Cuba related issues. 
Further, when looking at trade initiatives focused on former and present communist 
nations such as Russia, China and Vietnam, Congress has held a much more favorable 
tone.  One would speculate that outside the confines of ideology or some other constraint, 
members categorized as “free-traders” would be more likely to vote in favor of 
liberalizing trade relations with Cuba whereas those who vote against free trade would be 
more likely to oppose it.  
Within the constraints of party we can hypothesize that Republicans more than 
Democrats would be more likely to oppose Cuba. This assumption is based on an 
ideological conflict put forward by the Republican Party toward what is left of the 
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international communist movement, currently embodied in that of Cuban Presidente Fidel 
Castro.  
Democrats on the other hand, would be more open to liberalizing economic and 
political relations with Cuba. This in itself presents a complexity because Republicans as 
a group are more supportive of free trade, than their Democrat counterparts. The question 
then becomes why is Cuba “special”? Combinations of factors interact to make Cuba a 
special case in the post cold war era. For one thing Castro, a remnant from the Cold War, 
remains in power. Unlike other former/present communist nations, the leadership of Cuba 
has not changed. This factor may be important in determining policy towards Cuba. Such 
is consistent with relations currently with North Korea. Yet there is an inconsistency; in 
the case of Kadafi’s Libya, the US liberalized relations following Libya’s commitment to 
forfeit WMD production. The Cuba case is also special because within US domestic 
political infrastructure is the powerful Cuban American National Foundation and its PAC 
branch. This PAC exerts considerable political clout through donations and lobbying 
tactics.  
Overall, the goal of this research is to try to find the source of congressional 
animosity towards Cuba. Ideology may be a factor, but when trade is opened up to 
existing communist regimes such as Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China, it 
would be fair to say that something other than ideology is constraining US – Cuba 
relations and deadlocking it into a Cold War mindset.  
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II. Literature Review 
For more than thirty years, Cuba was a focal point for the Cold War. Before the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s close ideological and military partnership with the 
communist superpower posed a challenge to US foreign policy, especially in the Third 
World (Dominguez, 1989, 127). Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s the Cuban 
government, with Soviet backing was able to engage in international conflicts from every 
corner of the globe. From financing revolutionaries in El Salvador and Grenada, to actual 
ground troop support of African regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, Cuba presented itself as 
an active wing in the march for communist revolution (LeoGrande, 1998, 67).  
With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for 
foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union’s sponsorship, Cuba could 
no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its 
diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba’s international economic relations towards Latin 
America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries (LeoGrande, 
1998, 67).  
Ordinarily, such a massive shift in the international system would be expected to 
produce a significant change in US policy, as it did in the cases of Russia, Eastern 
Europe, China, Angola and Vietnam. But US policy toward Cuba has not changed little. 
(LeoGrande, 1998, 67) This constraint has if anything hurt economic liberalization of 
Cuba. In the post-Cold War period, Cuba has been forced to make hard decisions. These 
decisions were further complicated by the animosity the US put forth towards the Cuban 
government. During this period, Cuba has been forced to reconcile itself with the nations 
of the Caribbean. This process in itself was a challenge, because the nations of the 
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Caribbean are extremely dependent on the US and can be very vulnerable to US pressure 
tactics (Nunez, 1997, 82). This means that the US is the most important factor a 
Caribbean nation must consider when making the decision about whether or not to 
establish ties with Cuba.   
The US pressure on Caribbean policy can be seen in US blockage of Cuba’s entry 
into CARICOM. This was done by the US by offering to forgive the debts of several 
Caribbean nations if they voted against Cuba’s entry into the economic pact. In the post 
Cold War period, continued US hostility towards Cuba is inconsistent with the 
international dynamics in which global markets are opening up not tightening. Further, 
through the pressure put on by the global economy, the Cuban government has all but 
abandoned the Marxist experiment (Gonzalez, 1997, 90).  
The question then becomes: If continued hostility is not over communism, then 
what is the basis for its continuity?    
1. United States Trade Policy with Cuba  
Economic sanctions were imposed on trade with Cuba in 1960 after the rise of 
Fidel Castro and the socialist revolution, and shortly thereafter, the expropriation of US 
property in Cuba. Since initial economic sanctions were imposed, the embargo has been 
widened over the years to include restrictions on most commercial and financial 
transactions with Cuba. The state of US trade with Cuba is most affected by the following 
major statues: the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), the Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations of 1963 (CACR), the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA) and, most 
recently, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act). 
Additionally, in 2000 the Clinton Administration approved the Trade Sanctions Reform 
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and Export Enhancement Act that allowed for expanded sales of essential goods and 
services to nations under economic sanctions, including food, pharmaceutics, and 
medical equipment (LeoGrande, 2002, 326.). 
The initial imposition of restrictions began under Eisenhower and continued 
during the Kennedy Administration. The FAA of 1961 denied Cuba foreign assistance 
from the US and suspended Cuba’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status (USITC, 2001, 
337-341). With the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the US imposed further shipping 
restrictions, and in 1963, under the CACR Act the Department of the Treasury among 
other things: 1. prohibited all unlicensed commercial transaction with Cubans; 2. 
prohibited the direct or indirect (via third country) export and import of goods and 
services with Cuba; 3. and instituted a freeze on Cuban Government and private assets 
that essentially prohibited transfers of any kind without Treasury authorization 
(Symington, 2003, 4).  
During the 1970s both nations took important steps toward normalization of 
relations. In 1973, the US and Cuba signed an anti-hijacking agreement, followed by the 
allowance of subsidiaries of US companies in third nations to trade with Cuba, a 
relaxation of travel-spending allowances for US citizens traveling to Cuba, and in 1977 
an accord on fishing rights between the two nations. This economic relaxation was halted 
by renewed political disagreements when Cuba sent military forces to Africa in the late 
1970s, and the Reagan Administration renewed spending-limitations for Americans 




2. Helms-Burton Act 
On February 24, 1996, Cuban MiGs over the Straits of Florida shot down two 
civilian aircraft belonging to the Cuban exile group Brothers to the Rescue. For nearly a 
year the Cuban government had complained to Washington about this group’s repeated 
violation of Cuban national airspace. When the group flew aircraft over downtown 
Havana and dropped anti-Castro leaflets, the Cuban government’s patience ran out 
(LeoGrande, 1998, 80). 
The immediate effect of Cuban action against Brothers to the Rescue was 
Congress passing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the 
Helms Burton Act. This legislation incorporated existing US sanctions against Cuba and 
codified them into law. Prior to Helms Burton, the status of Cuban economic sanctions 
was the prerogative of the president. The president had the ability to tighten or relax 
sanctions as he saw fit. Under the Ford and Carter Administrations, the sanctions were 
relaxed and lower level diplomatic relations were established. President Reagan ended 
this relaxation as he pursued his anti communist agenda.  In the eyes of the Reagan 
Administration, Cuba was a mere puppet of Moscow and this Soviet intrusion in the 
Western Hemisphere would not be accepted.  With the passage of the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act, the sanctions became law, and thus much harder to remove 
until the day the Castro regime is gone and “democratic change” is brought to the island. 
Interestingly, under provisions of the bill the US has the right to determine what sort of 
“democratic” system will be acceptable in a post-Castro Cuba (Dominguez, 1997, 57).  
Jorge Dominguez argues in his essay From the Cold War to the Colder War 
(Dominguez, 1997, 49-75) that the passage of the Helms Burton Act may have dire 
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consequences for future US foreign policy. Before Helms Burton, the US could engage a 
policy of rewarding or punishing Cuba economically to gain favorable results. The 
language of the bill sets US policy in stone and leaves the US with few options should 
future relations become further complicated by a second shoot down (Dominguez, 1997, 
55). If such were to occur, the US may be left with no other option outside direct military 
intervention.  Such action would be very costly and yield only limited gains. Considering 
Cuba’s military still retains much of its Cold War - Soviet Era arms and many of its 
soldiers are veterans of conflict in Africa. Further, US military intervention on the island 
would further strain diplomatic relationships with traditional allies who up to this point 
have only condemned the sanctions in the United Nations (Dominguez, 1997, 62). 
This latest round of policy affecting the now post-Soviet Cuba reinstated most  
restrictions on commerce between the two nations, and perhaps more significantly, 
instituted limitations on trade between the US and nations with “ties to Cuban interests” 
by prohibiting these nations from loading or unloading in US ports (USITC, 2001, 2-4). 
Among other things, the CDA again prohibited subsidiaries of US firms abroad from 
trading with Cuba; prohibited any vessel that enters a Cuban port from unloading in the 
US within 180 days (effectively limiting other nations’ capacity to trade with Cuba so 
long as they are also trading with the US); provided additional power to the President to 
prohibit aid and assistance, and to limit the transfer of remittances to Cuba by US 
citizens; and instituted civil penalties for violators of these sanctions. The Helms Burton 
Act of 1996 most notably required US members of international financial institutions to 
oppose Cuban membership in those institutions; made the removal of sanctions 
dependent upon the return of expropriated US land in Cuba; and allowed for US nationals 
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whose land has been confiscated to bring suit against parties who profit from the use of 
that land (Symington, 2003, 6). 
3. Economic Impact on the United States 
The impact of restricted trade on the US economy suggests that economic 
sanctions against Cuba have had limited historical or current impact on the US ( USITC, 
2001, 12). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) produced a report in 1999 that 
concluded that, “to date, sanctions on foreign commerce have had only a small combined 
impact on the national economy.” (CBO, 1999, 12). That report found that the costs to 
the US economy that occurred were a result of foregone gains from the trade that 
economic theory of comparative advantage suggests would otherwise mutually benefit 
two nations engaging in free trade.  
The 1999 CBO report suggests that costs to the US are difficult to quantify, 
because “hard data rarely exists…and many costs appear only years later in the form of 
lost sales opportunity” (CBO, 1999, 12). However, studies show that quantifiable costs 
include the loss from reduced US exports, imports, and investment. Further, the US has 
had to bear the costs of establishing and enforcing sanctions policies. Less quantifiable 
costs have been shown to include costs for the private sector from reduced trade 
opportunities; reduced “competitiveness of US businesses if sanctions prohibit the 
provision of US government trade credits, guarantees, grants, and loans;” (USITC, 2001, 
14) costs associated with delays in receiving export licenses; lower supplies and higher 
prices for US consumers for certain goods and services, especially where substitutes are 
not readily available; and finally an externality effect from reduced trade with other 
nations due to fears that the US might be an unreliable trade partner (USITC, 2001, 14). 
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A study by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) quantified much 
of these factors. In the absence of sanctions, US-Cuban bilateral trade would have been 
between $658 million and $1 billion annually (USITC, 2001, 16). Estimated imports 
from Cuba would total between $69 million and $146 million (USITC, 2001, 14).. The 
study concluded that because such foregone gains represent less than 0.01 percent of US 
GDP, the impact on the US economy is negligible (USITC, 2001, 17). The CBO report 
found that sanctions have resulted in minimal economic costs to the US because Cuba’s 
small economy “accounted for only a small share of total US trade and foreign 
investment” (USITC, 2001, 22). In addition, minimal impact of sanctions results because 
Cuba’s economy has historically produced only low-value goods that are easily replaced.  
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the US applies sanctions, “where 
the least harm can come to well-organized domestic interests. Thus, the US government 
often uses sanctions in cases where there is little trade to disrupt in the first place” (CBO, 
1999, 49).  
Even if sanctions were lifted, because of Cuba’s socialist economic behavior, 
Cuba will likely limit the emergence of free trade with the US and other nations. Cuba 
maintains a restrictive investment regime that is both unappealing to foreign investment, 
and tightly controlled by the government based on political considerations (Symington, 
2003, 16). Further, trade and investment partners are often selected based on political 
considerations and not economic factors. A part of the deliberate political motives is a 
diversification of trading partners, which suggests Cuba might choose to build economic 
relations with less competitive nations rather than enhance trade with the US, even in the 
absence of sanctions (Messina, 2001, 23). 
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4. Domestic Pressures 
Scholars traditionally linked legislative voting behavior to campaign contributions 
received in the election cycle preceding the congressional vote (Mueller, 1989, 57). Such 
analysis implicitly assumes that the contract between the Political Action Committee 
(PAC) and the candidate specifies that the PAC first contributes to the election campaign, 
and the candidate, if elected, will vote in the next Congress in the interest of the 
contributor (Stratmann, 1995, 128). Two types of strategies are used by PACs to obtain 
results from their contributions. One emphasizes contributing to gain access to members 
of Congress who are positioned to be most helpful in advancing the policy interest of the 
PAC. The other focuses on electing people to Congress who will be more helpful to the 
PAC (Cigler and Loomis, 1991, 207) In the case of Cuba and the Cuban Embargo, the 
Cuban exile PAC, CANF, is principal.  
There have been many studies that that have examined whether campaign 
contributions affect election outcomes and legislator policy positions. Two studies that 
attempt to judge whether campaign contributions are given because of an electoral motive 
or an influence motive are by Stephen Bronars and John Lott (1997) test whether 
campaign contributions affect how congress members vote by examining their voting 
patterns in their last congressional cycle before retirement. If PAC contributions are 
pulling politicians away from voting in their preferred manner, they should move back to 
their preferred policy position after announcing their upcoming retirement because 
reelection is no longer a goal. Despite a large decline in campaign contributions received 
during their last election cycle, retiring legislators do not change their voting patterns in 
any significant manner.  Bronars and Lott interpret this evidence to mean that PAC 
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money does not influence how legislators vote, but rather that PACs are successful at 
sorting into office candidates who support their positions.  
Bender and Lott (1996) conclude that politicians vote in their constituent interests in “the 
vast majority of cases.” They argue that when campaign contributions do affect 
legislators’ voting behavior, the deviation between the representatives’ actions and 
constituency interests is not large. Morton and Cameron (1992) suggest that campaign 
money is more likely to affect legislators’ behavior when the economic effects of the bills 
under consideration are concentrated on particular interest groups and when the issues are 
less publicly visible. 
Following the Cuban Revolution, thousands of Cubans fled to south Florida, 
mainly Miami, in which they set up a base of hostility towards the Castro regime. This 
group of Cuban exiles later established one of the most powerful lobbying groups, the 
Cuban American National Foundation PAC. This organization has funneled literally 
millions into various campaign funds across both political parties with the key goal of 
retaining the economic embargo and achieving the eventual collapse of the Castro 
regime.  
The rise of the Cuban American lobby established a key domestic pressure within 
the US- Cuba relationship. CANF is the principal group working on the Cuba issue, with 
the goal of maintaining the anti-Castro embargo at its centerpiece (LeoGrande, 1998, 75). 
Without an organized counter movement supporting removal of the sanctions, CANF 
quickly came to dominate the scene. When the political costs of an international 
agreement fall disproportionately on a domestic group that is cohesive and politically 
mobilized, and the benefits of the agreement are diffusely distributed, the mobilized 
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group often has the power to block ratification (LeoGrande, 1998, 75). Feeling little but 
animosity toward Fidel Castro, the man who in their eyes caused them to be exiles from 
their own country, the majority of Cuban-Americans have been loyal supporters of 
policies that could potentially harm or weaken his government (Center for Responsible 
Politics, 2001, 4). Many of the first families to flee Cuba were wealthy and successful 
capitalists who began building new business empires in south Florida. Over the past 40 
years, these families have provided much of the financial support to press their case, and 
that of other Cubans who arrived in the wake of Castro's revolution. Their money and 
enterprise, along with the traditional anti-communist policies of successive American 
administrations, have given the community considerable political clout in Washington 
(Center for Responsible Politics, 2001, 4). When the reality of their largely monolithic 
voting bloc in south Florida is also taken into account, there can be no doubt that this 
community exerts significant influence on the outcome of any and all Cuba-related 
legislation in Congress (Center for Responsible Politics, 2001, 4).   
CANF is one of the key factors in continuing animosity between the US and 
Cuba. CANF often calls for harsher sanctions and strongly lobbies against any relaxation 
of the provisions of Helms-Burton. The fact is, without any real push on the other side, 
such as any business effort to remove the embargo, the strength of this PAC may be 
enough to keep the embargo in place (Brenner, 2004, 73). The prospect of opening Cuba 
up to American tourism and selling Cuban cigars in American markets has yet to attain 
such a high demand that it would be worth the possible clash with this powerful PAC. 
The case of normalized relations with Vietnam could be considered a similar case 
without the PAC interference. Without an organized, mobilized anti-Hanoi Vietnamese 
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PAC, trade relations with Vietnam were able to be normalized with no domestic 
resistance (Brenner, 2004, 73).  
Interestingly, there has been a slow easing of the embargo. Representative Jeff 
Flake of Arizona, who is considered a critic of the Castro administration, has stated that 
he believes the embargo will not dislodge the Castro administration; but the best way to 
dislodge Castro and promote freedom in Cuba, in his opinion would be to swarm the 
island with American tourists (Marquis, 2002, NYT). Representative Flake is author of 
the Flake Amendments to Helms Burton. These amendments remove some of the travel 
and financial restrictions put on Americans who seek travel to Cuba.  
The comments by Representative Flake reveal a split among Republicans in their 
attitudes towards Cuba with a sizable minority favoring more liberal trade with the island 
nation. For Republicans like Representative Flake, the Cuba issue is more a free trade 
issue than an ideological issue and it is in the liberalizing of trade that this conflict will be 
resolved. 
Republicans are confident that the worldwide trade agenda is full of promise. If 
some nations choose to opt out, they will see how other countries accepting economic 
freedom will advance on their own. This is a vision of private initiative encouraged, not 
stifled, by governments (GOP, 2000, 9). 
Looking at the above statements, one could conclude that Republicans would support free 
trade with Cuba as a means to advance economic freedom. Yet the 2004 GOP Platform 
stated the following: As Republicans, we support President Bush’s principled position 
that the current embargo on trade with, and restrictions on travel to, Cuba must remain in 
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place. Republicans understand that the Castro regime will not change by its own choice 
(GOP, 2004, 27). 
On the issue of free trade, the Democratic Party Platform of 2004 states that: We 
will effectively enforce our trade laws protecting against dumping, illegal subsidies, and 
import surges that threaten American jobs. New trade agreements must protect 
internationally recognized workers' rights and environmental standards and Human 
Rights as vigorously as they now protect commercial concerns (DNC, 2004, 20-21). 
Democrats, though not endorsing the Castro regime or lifting the embargo, take 
an approach much softer than Republicans.  We support effective and peaceful strategies 
to end the Castro regime as soon as possible and enable the Cuban people to take their 
rightful place in the democratic Community of the Americas. Within this framework the 
Democratic Party supports a policy of principled travel to Cuba that promotes family 
unity and people-to-people contacts through educational and cultural exchanges (DNC, 
2000, 11).  
Despite stated platforms, political parties no longer clearly align on trade and 
foreign policy issues. Party voting is most contentious when the legislation under 
consideration is controversial and means major changes ( Mundo, 1999 , 91).  
By the 1990s it was more difficult to break down support and opposition to free 
trade by simple party identification. Unions, traditional allies of the Democrats, were at 
the forefront of the opposition to NAFTA. Business, traditional allies of the Republicans, 
tended to support free trade, but there were many fissions in the economic dividing lines. 
Businesses hard hit by global trade, such as the shoe industry and agriculture, favored 
protection. Environmentalists, also traditional allies of the Democrats, were even more 
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badly split (Uslaner, 9, 1994). Trade opponents on both the left and the right worried 
about both child labor practices and civil liberties more generally in countries that would 
benefit from trade accords (Uslaner, 9, 1994). With this said, ideology is a more 





















III. Theory and Hypotheses 
In the view of most scholars, the politics of trade policy is dominated by interests, 
outlooks, and strategies directly related to the impact of trade patterns on American 
society and to the evolution of the trading system as a whole (Cohen, 2001, 92). 
Domestic and international groups mobilize to support or oppose policy choices 
according to the likely impact of these choices on their interests, politicians make 
calculations of the immediate and long-term costs and benefits of different policy 
positions and institutions intervene to shape and constrain the options open to 
policymakers and political actors (Cohen, 2001, 93). Ideology modifies this picture of 
this process, since ideological commitments work to limit or redirect perceptions that 
political actors have of their interests and priorities (Cohen, 2001, p 93). 
Votes on trade, sanctions, and tariffs have expanded effects well beyond a House 
member’s district. Such votes can have profound effects on a Congress member’s 
electability as such votes will likely be controversial within that member’s own party and 
even within that member’s traditional base. An example can be seen in 2005; Senator 
David Vitter voted against CAFTA due to heavy lobbying by the sugar industry of 
Louisiana. On this same issue, international freight companies lobbied hard for the newly 
elected senator to support the bill as a sign that Louisiana was willing to embrace free 
trade. For this vote, Senator Vitter had to weigh the costs of supporting or opposing the 
bill. Supporting the bill could mean loss of support of Louisiana sugar, opposing the bill 
would not only split Vitter with a large chunk of his base, but also would show that 
Louisiana was not willing to accept this proposal despite the fact that it could have 
profound positive effects for that state’s future.  
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Expanded free trade will have profound national impact that can be felt from the 
local market to the stock market. Jobs will be gained and lost depending on that 
industry’s ability to adapt to the global market. Even if such a vote does not have direct 
implications for the given House member’s district, inter-congressional lobbying and 
pork barrel project negotiations could be affected by how a House member votes. The 
fact that these votes are part of public record requires the House member to stand behind 
their vote and be able to defend that choice in the future.  
Considering the weight votes on trade, sanctions, and tariffs have, I would argue 
that House members make rational choices and are rational actors in deciding to vote yes 
or no on a trade related bill. House members realize that however they vote will be 
recorded by allies, opponents, lobbyists, human rights NGOs and even other House 
members (Goldstein, 1993).  House members must choose a vote they can stand behind 
and support in the future especially if they wish to succeed in Washington. Members 
must seek the greatest gain with the least amount of cost.  
In the case noted above, it could be assumed that Senator Vitter understood that 
the votes were on the table and CAFTA was going to pass whether or not he supported it. 
By opposing it, he assured future support of Louisiana sugar farmers. Despite his 
opposition, the bill will still have profound effects for the Port of New Orleans as it 
becomes a major hub for trade with Central and South America. The bill passed whether 
or not Vitter supported it, but he still gained the benefits of the bill passing. By opposing 
CAFTA, he gained possible future benefits of being able to call back on that vote as a 
sign of his support for the Louisiana sugar industry. I would argue, had the vote been a 
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lot closer, Senator Vitter would have been reeled in by the party leadership and his 
support of CAFTA would have been demanded.   
Ideology is a central factor in US policy choices. The most important contribution 
in this area has been made by Judith Goldstein, who argues that the analysis of interests, 
power structures, and institutions is not enough to explain the patterns of change and 
continuity in American trade policy and politics (Goldstein, 1993, 67). The turn toward 
global free trade in the 1940s can be fully grasped only in the light of the consolidation of 
an ideological commitment to the benefits of a liberal trading order, as well as an 
intellectual critique of the dangers of protectionism (Goldstein, 1993, 71). This view 
holds that the study of ideology is crucial to understanding the persistence of the elite 
commitment to open markets since the 1970s in the face of a powerful resurgence of 
protectionism. The continuing power of free trade politics stems from the consolidation 
of a widespread aversion to the protectionist policies that had been central to American 
political economy before the 1940s (Goldstein, 1993, 94). 
A finite number of variables are inherent in trade policy decisions. There are a 
number of basic guidelines and, to use a phrase of Max Weber’s, “general laws and 
events” that can be used to identify recurring patterns of US trade policy-making 
behavior. Policymakers must be responsive to, among other things, the political needs of 
the president and senior advisors, the foreign policy objectives of a global superpower, 
public opinion and the forcefully articulated demands of interest groups (Cohen, 1996, 
123).  
Ideology appears to be the central focus in determining a representative’s 
stance on Cuba; therefore if a member has a conservative ideology then he or she is 
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are more likely  to oppose trade with Cuba despite the tendency for conservative 
members to be steadfast supporters of free trade.  Liberalized trade with Cuba thus 
becomes one of those inconsistencies mentioned by Dr. Cohen: The dominant economic 
ideology of US foreign trade policy since the late 1930s is easy to identify: It has been 
liberal trade – the pursuit of reduced barriers to the flow of international commerce. 
However, a single decision making model placing primary emphasis on this belief system 
is not plausible in view of the number of exceptions to a market orientated trade policy 
that consistently appear in the decision-making process (Cohen, 1996, 123). 
Thus there are critical questions: Why have these deviations to the guiding 
philosophy been made? Equally fundamental, which domestic and international economic 
or political consideration will dominate in a particular policy-making situation? What is 
on the minds of policy-makers that cause the interests of one constituency to triumph 
over others? The answer to each question is imprecise: It depends on the combination of 
personalities and the circumstances at hand (Cohen, 1996, 123). With so many of these 
combinations possible in a decision-making exercise, the relative importance of any 
given variable is in a constant state of flux. So, too, is the US government’s policy-
making apparatus, which is somewhere between haphazard and ultra-flexible in nature 
(Cohen, 1996, 123). The key to understanding the functioning of the trade policymaking 
system is to recognize that varying circumstances associated with any given decision 
dictate that different actors will be in charge, different behavioral patterns will dominate, 
and different constituencies and perceptions will be given priority treatment (Cohen, 
1996, 123). The process that has evolved to reconcile the conflicting interests associated 
with trade decision lacks the precision, single-mindedness, and conformity to repeatedly 
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use identical criteria and a fixed set of procedures to calculate which needs and objectives 
get priority attention (Cohen, 1996, p123). 
Voting on other issues such as free trade, sanctions and free trade with other 
communist nations will also be determined by ideology.  Ideology will be the most 
important factor in determining a member of congress’s position on the issues of 




















1. Members of Congress 
  
This research began by first collecting a list of all members of congress who served in the 
102-109th Congresses. For this analysis, I examine members who served any number of 
terms as long as they cast votes on the key votes listed in the 1992-2006 period. This 
would explore the full scope of post Cold War era votes on free trade and Cuba.   
Lists were first divided into their respective Congresses with each member lined 
up with their respective voting record. Key votes were then isolated in each congress and 
numbered based on chronological casting. From this point the sets were combined. I 
began by stacking them with 102 on the top and 109 on the bottom. The votes were 
numbered relative to each other and thus for example under the 109th Congress, votes for 
the 102 through 108th were blank as that part of the dataset only looked at the 109th.  
Once this set was compiled, the data was sorted first by name then state then 
congress. In the cases in which members served more than one term, their vote data was 
combined to show a record for that members voting. When this was completed it resulted 
in 926 cases.  
The unit of analysis is the individual member. This work contrasts member voting 
patterns with ideology scores as well as using demographic characteristics as a control to 
get a better picture of this phenomenon  
2. Roll Call Votes 
The Rosenthal-Poole dataset categorizing role call votes for this period was used 
to gain results for which member of congress voted in what manner, it being Yes, No or 
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Abstain. The votes collected were coded in a negative one, zero, one scale. In general, 
one is equitable to a Yes vote and negative one is a No vote. To remain consistent 
though, this is reversed when rather than liberalizing trade the Yes vote is a vote to 
constrain it. The code of zero represents a congressman’s unwillingness to take a position 
on the given issue. This would include both abstaining from voting and not being present 
for the particular roll call vote.  
When these data are collected, five scales are created. These scales were then 
divided by the total number of votes per category, thus giving a percentage in favor or 
against. The closer the number is to positive one, the more the congress member voted in 
favor of that issue. The closer the number is to negative one, the more the congress 
member is against that issue. This also balanced out the effect of measuring a one term 
congressman with one who served several terms.  
The five areas looked at are: Cuba, sanctions, tariffs, former/present communist 
nations other than Cuba and free trade initiatives.  
Cuba votes looked at everything dealing directly or indirectly to Cuba. Everything 
from Helm-Burton and its amendments to agricultural sales to the island nation were 
looked at. This list included 13 votes. This measure is used as the dependent variable for 
this analysis. 
Sanctions votes looked at the implementation of sanctions. Although the Cuban 
Embargo is a type of sanction it is considered separate from this category as to see a 
member of congress’s attitude towards the use of sanctions. In this analysis sanctions 
towards Iran, Burma and the Sudan are included. All of these nations have little to 
nothing in common with Cuba. This measure will show if a congress member’s attitude 
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towards sanctions is consistent with their attitude towards the Cuban embargo. This 
included 5 votes.  
The push for free trade has declined the use of tariffs, though tariffs are still an 
important part of international trade. Their implementation presents hostility towards the 
idea of free trade and signals a more protectionist stance in that they impose a limit on an 
import to protect a domestic competitor. The most relevant tariff vote in recent history 
was the steel tariff vote meant to protect the domestic steel industry from the global 
market. This included three votes.  
Most of the communist votes look at the relationship the United States had 
towards China and the renewal of MFN status to permanent MFN status for the PRC. 
This also included trade dealing with the former Warsaw Pact, Russia and CIS nations 
and South East Asia. This included 15 votes. Separating “communist votes” out of free 
trade votes was done to see what effect of a nation being communist had on a member of 
congress’s willingness to trade with that nation. Communism is one of the issues that 
imposed the embargo, but it may not necessarily be the reason for continued 
implementation.     
Free trade votes looked at all other aspects of trade not covered by the above four. 
This would include NAFTA, CAFTA, WTO and bilateral trade arrangements. This 
included 37 votes. The free trade issue is one of the main areas of analysis. The object of 
this research is to determine what factors cause some congress members hold a 
schizophrenic stance of supporting free trade while opposing liberalized trade with Cuba. 
On the other end, there are also examples of members of congress opposing free trade, 
but supporting liberalized trade with Cuba.  
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However, some votes did not particularly deal with the trade issue, for example 
102-423 Promote Democracy in Cuba. Votes such as this one were included because it 
will also help shape the opinion on the issue. Votes such as this one and the disapproval 
for the Olympics in China show hostility towards that nation. Although such votes would 
not have a direct consequence for trade, such votes show a deeper opinion on the given 
nation. A full list of votes used in this analysis can be found in Appendix 1.  
3. D-Nominate Ideology Scores 
 Partisanship can be a good indicator of whether a member of congress will be 
open to free trade and liberalized relations with Cuba. Partisanship cannot, however, 
determine the degree of that support. Considering the polarization of the two parties and 
the realignment following the Reagan era, the variable of ideology will be used to 
determine how the politician is aligned in the left-right continuum. This value will show 
the effect being a conservative, moderate or leftist will have on how a congress member 
votes on the issues of free trade and Cuba policy. By looking at the ideological 
differences within the party it can be seen why CANF lobbies both Democrats and 
Republicans. Both issues are affected by more than just party labels.  Ideology may lead a 
representative to one party or another, but ideology is not the only factor within that 
representative’s decision making process.   
  For an ideology measurement, I used the Rosenthal-Poole D-Nominate dataset 
compiled by Dr. Howard Rosenthal and Dr. Keith Poole. A short description of how it 
was compiled is as follows: For each house of Congress, all recorded roll call decisions in 
the first 99 Congresses formed the basis of the simultaneous estimation of the spatial 
(ideological) positions of all members of Congress serving from 1789 to 1985. These 
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estimations became the foundation of their book Congress: A Political-Economic History 
of Roll Call Voting (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). This work is devoted to showing that 
important episodes in American political and economic history can be better understood 
by supplementing and/or reinterpreting more traditional analyses with the basic space 
theory of ideology as measured by the D-NOMINATE scores. This data is compiled and 
updated by these two professors and is available publicly on their website:  
www.pooleandrosenthal.com/ 
4. Other Constraints  
Other variables looked at were: Hispanic Population, Is the member from Florida 
or New Jersey, Is the member Hispanic, Does the member receive support from CANF?  
The Hispanic population was determined using the 2000 census data and is given 
as a percentage of the total population of the given congressional district. The data 
accounts for Hispanics as a whole rather than breaking that demographic into sub groups 
that would more accurately reflect this demographic. This limitation of census data will 
lead to limited results if the Cuba issue is not seen in the Hispanic community as a 
Hispanic issue and only seen as one affecting the subset of Cuban Americans. The 
question this variable proposes is does the size of a district’s Hispanic population have an 
impact on a congress member’s position on Cuba? The significance of this variable will 
determine if promoting the embargo is seen as a “pan-Hispanic” issue. 
Because a high concentration of the Cuban-American population resides in 
Florida and New Jersey, a dummy variable is used to account for geography to see if 
being from either of these states influences a representative’s stance on Cuba. This 
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control would determine if CANF concentrates its efforts on regional strongholds where 
CANF can have the most direct impact on election outcomes.  
Another dummy variable used was whether the member is Hispanic or not. The 
theory behind this question is that with a racial connection to the Cuban people, Hispanic 
members would more likely side with the plight of the Cuban people.  
Last, I included a variable for members who had received some form of support 
from one of CANF’s PACS. Scholars traditionally linked legislative voting behavior to 
campaign contributions received in the election cycle preceding the congressional vote 
(Mueller, 1989, 57). Such analysis implicitly assumes that the contract between the 
Political Action Committee (PAC) and the candidate specifies that the PAC first 
contributes to the election campaign, and the candidate, if elected, will vote in the next 
Congress in the interest of the contributor (Stratmann, 1995, 128). There can be no doubt 
that CANF exerts significant influence on the outcome of any and all Cuba-related 
legislation in Congress (CRP, 2001, 4).   
This data was collected using the data published on opensecrets.com which is a 
website that analyzes FEC contributions. No scale is given as to represent how much is 
given, just that support passed from this group to the member.   
5. Regression 
For this analysis, a linear regression model is run using SPSS. Regression is used 
because a members Cuba score is a function of the other variables. Regression will help 
determine this relationship. For this model, the Cuba score assigned to the congress 
member is the dependent variable with communist, free trade, tariff, sanction, and 
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ideology1 scores as independents. The variables Florida-New Jersey, Hispanic 
population, Member Hispanic are used as control variables and are based off 
demographic characteristics.  This model seeks to find the underlying reasoning for 
support or opposition to liberalized relations with Cuba. Result charts are located in 
Appendix 2. 
The model appears to suggest the following: 
1. As support for free trade increases, that member is also more likely to support 
liberalized relations with Cuba.  The effect of supporting free trade has a strong positive 
relation with supporting Cuba trade. As a Representative becomes more willing to accept 
free trade he/she also becomes more open to trade with Cuba. With this it can be 
determined that those who strongly support free trade are likely to be in support of lifting 
the embargo. The Representatives who only slightly supports free trade or those who 
have a percentage score approaching zero will most likely oppose trade with Cuba. The 
vast bulk of Representatives looked at scored within this range and explains why a free 
trade policy is pursued slowly with Cuba. 
2. Ideology2 has a strong negative relation with support of Cuba. This would 
mean as a Representative moves further to the Right on the political spectrum they would 
be less willing to support increased trade with Cuba. Those on the Left would be more 
open to trade with Cuba. For moderates, it would depend on whether their stances were 
center-left or center right and their stance would help determine where they lie on this 
issue.   
                                                 
1 For this analysis, Ideology is used rather than Party because ideology gives a more precise measure. Using both in the 
analysis causes data errors as the two are highly correlated.  
2 To focus more on Ideology and to marginalize the effect of trade voting, a separate analysis was performed using 
Cuba – Free Trade as dependent with ideology, Communist, Florida-NewJersey, Hispanic population, Member 
Hispanic, Tariffs, Sanctions, CANF$ as independent. There was little difference in the results. Only Ideology became 
more significant. No change elsewhere.  
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33. Support for sanctions has a positive correlation with support for Cuba. I 
assume this result is spurious because not enough sanction votes were used in this 
analysis to determine a good measure for support/opposition to sanctions. I would assume 
that if a larger number of votes were available, members who are opposed to liberalized 
trade with Cuba would be in support of sanctions because the embargo on Cuba is a form 
of a sanction.  
4.  Support for tariffs does not present a significant relationship.  
5. Support for increasing trade with other communist countries yields significant 
results. This shows that communism is not the most important factor in determining a 
member’s stance on Cuba. This may, in part, show the effect of the Castro regime itself. 
Unlike other former/present communist nations, the leadership of Cuba has not changed. 
This factor may be important in determining policy towards Cuba. This is consistent with 
relations currently with North Korea. Although North Korea and the Kim Jong-Il factor 
cannot be tested, I would argue that a similar relationship exists because the policies of 
Kim Jong-Il have been a continuation of the late Kim Il-Sung. Thus in the case of Cuba, a 
shift from Fidel to Raul Castro would not constitute a change in relations.  These results 
may also show the results of other nations shifting policy in the post Cold War Period. 
All other present and former communist countries besides Cuba and North Korea have 
made significant efforts to liberalize their economic policies and marginalize if not all 
together eliminate Marxist revolutionary rhetoric.   
6. Both Hispanic population and member Hispanic yielded insignificant results. 
The effect of the Hispanic population within a representative’s district as well as the 
                                                 
3 When the analysis was run with this variable was removed, significance for Communist and ideology slightly 
increases. There is no difference in the overall outcome.   
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representative themselves being Hispanic has little to no effect on voting patterns on 
Cuba. This may be because the Cuba issue is not a Pan-Hispanic issue, but one that only 
affects the Cuban Americans. Further, the CANF garnishes its power form the wealth of 
its supporters. A large bulk of the Cubans who left Cuba following the Castro Revolution 
were fairly well off in Cuba and were able to establish themselves and through their 
capital base, able to promote CANF. This differs dramatically from much of the Hispanic 
population which comes to the US as poor, unskilled labor. Although the Cubans may 
make up a small percentage of the overall Hispanic population, what they lack in 
numbers they make up for with money. Further research will need to be done to isolate 
Cuban enclaves within the US as well as determine which Representatives receive 
donations and support from CANF.  What is proved from this is that the issue of toppling 
the Castro regime is only important to Cuban Americans, and not Hispanics as a whole.  
7. The effect of a representative being from Florida or New Jersey also yielded 
insignificant results. Despite CANF’s strong position in both states, this would show that 
their position focuses more on individual members rather than just members that are from 
there strongholds. This also shows that the Cuba issue is not bound to a specific 
geographic location.  
 8. Members receiving support from CANF yielded the most significant results 
found. This variable was even more significant than ideology. It is undetermined whether 
CANF uses the support to sway a congress member’s position or that the congress 
member already held this position and would have voted that way with or without direct 
support from CANF. While this may be undetermined, it is obvious that CANF donates 
only to members who vote consistently against Cuba.  
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V. Discussion 
Congressional voting on US trade policy toward Cuba has a multifaceted 
complexity stemming from ideological stance, party allegiances and individual 
preferences on issues. This problem is further complicated when comparing voting on 
Cuba with members voting records on trade policy including free trade initiatives, tariffs 
and sanctions. Further, when looking at trade initiatives focused on former and present 
communist nations such as Russia, China and Vietnam, Congress has held a much more 
favorable tone.  One could speculate that outside the confines of ideology or some other 
constraint, members categorized, as “free-traders” would be more likely to vote in favor 
of liberalizing relations with Cuba whereas those who vote against free trade would be 
more likely to oppose it.  
I hypothesized that Republicans more than Democrats would be more likely to 
oppose Cuba; however, Republicans generally are more supportive of free trade, than 
their Democrat counterparts. Findings showed that the issue of Cuba was split along 
ideological lines with those to the further right opposing trade with Cuba, while moving 
further left a Representative would be more likely to support it.  
The dominant economic ideology of US foreign trade policy since the late 1930s 
has been liberal trade – the pursuit of reduced barriers to the flow of international 
commerce. However, a single decision making model placing primary emphasis on this 
belief system is not plausible in view of the number of exceptions to a market orientated 
trade policy that consistently appear in the decision-making process (Cohen, 1996, 123). 
This model looking at contemporary Cuba policy emphasizes one of these 
exceptions Dr. Cohen speaks about. The Cuba model does not fit in with other models of 
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free trade politics because other factors such as CANF influence the actions of 
policymakers. Further, policymakers own views of Cuba and the Castro regime could 
overshadow that policymaker’s general tendency to support liberal trade.  
Looking at voting patterns on sanctions and tariffs, there were not enough votes 
available to truly target the effect of supporting or opposing either.  
Interestingly, comparing voting on Cuba to voting on other communist nations 
yields significant results. This shows that communism is not the most important factor in 
determining a member’s stance on Cuba. These results do show one major point: the 
argument that maintaining the embargo is rooted in an ideological clash with communism 
is a falsehood. Congress has consistently voted to liberalize trade with former and present 
communist nations, especially China. This result of insignificance shows that members 
are not opposed to Cuba necessarily because of its communist nature alone.  This may, in 
part, show the effect of the Castro regime itself. Unlike other former/present communist 
nations, the leadership of Cuba has not changed. This divergence in policy may be 
because policymakers seek regime change in Cuba to seriously consider policy change. 
Regime change may alter a state’s utilities in such a way that policies and alliance 
structure would change too. All regime changes are not the same and thus they type of 
regime change also determines policy change. (Siverson, 1994, 148) If this theory is true; 
to see any real change in US-Cuba policy, regime change would mean more than 
replacing Fidel with Raul Castro.   
 Further, with the case of Cuba exists the Cuban American National Foundation. 
Domestic and international groups mobilize to support or oppose policy choices 
according to the likely impact of these choices on their interests, politicians make 
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calculations of the immediate and long-term costs and benefits of different policy 
positions and institutions intervene to shape and constrain the options open to 
policymakers and political actors (Cohen, 2001, 93). 
Many studies have examined whether campaign contributions affect election 
outcomes and legislator policy positions.  The study conducted by Stephen Bronars and 
John Lott (1997) test whether campaign contributions affect how congress members vote 
by examining their voting patterns in their last congressional cycle before retirement. 
They concluded that despite a large decline in campaign contributions received during 
their last election cycle, retiring legislators do not change their voting patterns in any 
significant manner.  Bronars and Lott interpret this evidence to mean that PAC money 
does not influence how legislators vote, but rather that PACs are successful at sorting into 
office candidates who support their positions.  
Another study conducted by Bender and Lott (1996) conclude that politicians vote 
in their constituent interests in “the vast majority of cases.” They argue that when 
campaign contributions do affect legislators’ voting behavior, the deviation between the 
representatives’ actions and constituency interests is not large.  
From the results of studies on PAC contributions, we can hypothesize that the 
actions of PACs is rational. A result of this rationality is that PACs will contribute to 
representatives who already support the PAC’s position. PACs will also put pressure on 
policymakers opposed to their position by contributing to opponents during a re-election 
campaign. In a contested district where the PAC is highly motivated and organized, the 
PAC can have a direct effect on the election outcome not only by contributing money and 
volunteers but also in contributing votes.   
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While it is difficult methodologically to attribute legislative outcomes to the work 
of any particular lobbyist, members of Congress on both sides of the Cuba issue agreed 
that CANF’s efforts were by far the most extensive, expensive and sophisticated. 
(LeoGrande, 1998, 40) CANF uses its voting bloc and money influence policy by 
supporting (or opposing) policymakers that hold divergent views on the Cuba issue. The 
results from this research show that the most important factor in determining a 
policymaker’s stance on trade with Cuba was not how much they had supported free 
trade in the past or their political affiliation, but it was whether or not they had received 
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Appendix 1: Roll Call Votes 
Trade Votes: 
For trade votes dealing with all aspects of liberalizing trade relations  
The votes looked at were as follows: 
 
1.  102-354 Intl Coop Act 
2.  103-575 NAFTA 
3.  103-573 NAFTA 
4.  103-247 Fast Track 
5.  103-031 Export Authorizations act 
6.  103-477 Export Admin Act 
7.  105-627 Delay Exit Entry Control 
8.  105-570 Caribbean & Cent American Trade 
9.  105-534 Exportation of Supercomputers 
10.  105-466 Fast Track 
11.  105-047 Trade, Sub-Saharan Africa 
12.  106-307 African/Central American trade 
13.  106-145 Caribbean trade 
14.  106-310 WTO Establishment 
15.  106-145A Africa trade bill 
16.  107-481 Fast Track 
17.  107-370 trade act of 2002 
18.  108-436 Chile Free Trade 
19.  108-435 Chile Free trade 
20.  108-434 Chile free trade 
21.  108-432 Singapore free trade 
22.  108-431 Singapore free trade 
23.  108-430 Singapore free trade 
24.  108-416 US Chile Free trade 
25.  108-415 US Chile Free trade 
26.  108-414 US Chile Free trade 
27.  108-413 US Chile Free trade 
28.  108-413 US- Morocco Free Trade 
29.  108-375 Australia Free Trade 
30.  109-616 US- Bahrain Free Trade 
31.  109-442 CAFTA 
32.  109-443 CAFTA 
33.  109-437 Trade Rights enforcement 
34.  109-436 Trade Rights enforcement 
35.  109-433 Trade Rights enforcement 
36.  109-432 Trade Rights enforcement 
37.  109-239 Anti- WTO 
*Italics indicates Yes vote coded as -1 
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Communist Trade Votes: 
 
Votes dealing with all aspects of liberalizing trade relations with present and former 
communist nations. 
1.  102-436 MFN China 
2. 102-412 Czechoslovakia 
3. 102-285 Disapprove MFN for China 
4.  102-043 MFN China 
5. 103-366 Oppose Olympics in China 
6. 103-347 Disapprove MFN for China 
7. 103-381 MFN China 
8. 104-537 Disapproval MFN China 
9. 105-038 Hong Kong Trade 
10. 104-285 China MFN Renewal 
11. 105-492 Export/import in China 
12. 105-231 China Trading resolution 
13. 105-356 Disapproval for wavier on Vietnam 
14. 105-317 Disapproval, normal relation w/ China 
15. 106-365 Vietnam trade 
16. 106-338 Normal trade relations status China 
17. 106-409 Russia CIS trade 
18. 106-228 Permanent trade relations China 
19. 107-255 China trade 




Votes dealing with imposing sanctions and thus restricting trade with nations are as 
follows: 
 
1. 104-250 Iran-Libya Sanctions 
2. 105-211 Iran missile sanctions 
3. 107-160 Sudan sanctions 
4. 107-276 Iran/Libya sanctions 




Votes that constrict trade, but do not restrict it are as follows: 
  
1. 102-121 shipbuilding tariff 
2. 102-120 shipbuilding tariff 





All votes dealing with Cuba are as follows: 
 
1. 102-423 Promote Democracy in Cuba 
2. 104-683 Helms-Burton 
3. 104-047 Helms-Burton 
4. 104-046 Medicine to Cuba 
5. 106-469 Ease sanctions 
6. 106-362 Ease travel restrictions 
7. 106-480 increase spending limit 
8. 106-428 Embargo, treasury allotment 
9. 107-330 Gross amendment to H-B 
10. 107-105 Ag sales 
11. 107-333 Rangel Amendment to H-B 
12. 107-332 Flake travel Amendment 1 
13. 107-331 Flake Travel 2 
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Regression table for the factors in determining Congressional 
Roll Call Voting Support for Cuba 1991-2006 
 
 B t Sig 
    
Ideology -.030 -2.062 .040** 
Communist .096 2.096 .036** 
Tariff .028 1.463 .144 
Sanctions .136 7.599 .000*** 
Free Trade .071 3.106 .002*** 
Hispanic Population 
2000 .037 .847 .397 
Florida-New Jersey .005 .230 .818 
Representative 
Hispanic -.024 -.714 .475 
CANF $ -.291 -12.147 .000*** 
(Constant) .029 2.968 .003*** 
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